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CHARLES B. JUDAH

New Mexico's Legislature
~ On the whole New Mexico's Legislature has been more successful in

keeping abreast of the times than either tp~ political parties or the
state's system of administration. The Legislapve Council, the use of
interim committees, and reorganization of th~ committee system indicate a willingness to employ new devices in order more effectively to
deal with increasingly complex problems.
It is also probably true that the quality of the legislators has gradually improved, that they are less provincial, more highly educated, and
better informed regarding public affairs than has been true in the past.
This improvement may well be the reSult of improvement in the educationallevel and channels of communication in the state and naqon
as a whole, but whatever the reason, it makes for more responsible
\.
.
legislation.
Nonetheless, serious problems remain. Some of the more fundamental of these, the form of the Legislature, the time and length of its
. sessions, apportionment, derive from the constitution itself.
Democracy is based on the principle of, equality in representation.
In New Mexico this principle is violated in the apportionment of seats
in both House and Senate. The Senate is composed of one member
from each of the thirty-two counties. The 1950 census shows the counties ranging in population from Bernalillo's 145,673 to Harding's 3,013This is a ratio of about 48 people in Bernalillo County to 1 in Harding.
Each has one senator. Although this represents the extreme, the inequalities are sharp elsewhere, and recent surveys show that the trend
since 1950 is, with a few exceptions, ,for the big counties (in population) to increase at a continually more rapid rate than the small.
Charles B.ludah, who has his B.A., M.A., and PhD. from the University
of Illinois, is Professor of Government at UNM. He has published material
not only in his field but has two historical novels to his credit. This article
appeared originally in somewhat diHerent form in "The 47th State," a
pamphlet issued by the UNM Division of Government Research.
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What of the House? If the principle of equal representation is violated in one chamber, is it not even more imp.ortant that it be observed in the other? In New Mexico it is violated in both. As 'presently
apportioned, Bernalillo County has one representative in the lower
house for every 16,186 people; Harding has one for every 3,013 people.
The ratio is considerably under the 48 to 1 found in the Senate, but it
is still slightly over 5 to 1, a significant difference. Again Bernalillo and
Harding represent the extreme, but the total effect of the present apportionment is over-representation of the more thinly populated, and
generally poorer, sections. In perhaps more familiar terms it means
over-representation of the rural at the expense of the urban voter. This
in tum poses the threat of the failure of ,a majority of the legislators
either to understand or to give proper consideration to the problem of
a growing urban community.
The problem of apportionment is not, of course, peculiar to New
Mexico. Nor is it as yet even acute. However, as the state grows in
population it will become increasingly grave and consideration of it
now might well save trouble in the future.
The state constitution says that the Legislature may reapportion
by statute after the publication of the United States Government's
decennial census. It does not say that it must, nor that s\lch reapportionment must result in equal representation for the people of the ..
state. Even if it were amended to compel just apportionment of the
House it is doubtful if a recalcitrant Legislature could be compelled
to act. In other states, the courts have been reluctant ~o rule on what
they have commonly regarded as a political matter. However, New
Mexico might well consider following the example of Congress and
enact a statute requiring automatic reapportionment by an outside
agency according to a fixed formula following each census. True, such
a statute could be repealed at the will of the Legislature, but ordinarily
it is more difficult and politically dangerous to repeal a just law than
to ignore an unjust situation.
The constitution provides that the Legislature shall meet in regular
session in January after each general election, and shall remain in session for not more than sixty days. This was probably often enough and
long enough in 1910. Since then, government's functions have expanded far beyond the expectations of the men who shaped the constitution. Today state government is big business in terms of budget
and bigger business in terms of the variety of its activities. It directly
affects far more people in the state than does any segmel1t of the private
,
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economy. Yet the Legislature which so largely determines the policy
of, state government normally meets only sixty days every two years.
Such a practice would be regarded as fantastic and probably suicidal
in private business and industry. Surely the advisability of annual
sessions should be considered.
The timing of sessions also merits discussion. The elections are in
November. Some sixty days later the legislators must meet, presumably prepared to consider a multitude of problems. After another sixty
days they go home, the problems acted upon or shelved, their duty
done, for many of them their careers as active legislators finished.
This crowding raises problems. The legislators, particularly those
elected for the first time, cannot reasonably be expected to have informed themselves upon mo.re than a fraction of the issues they must
face. This may result in uninformed legislation; it is more likely to
result in decision passing from the representatives of the people to
representatives of pressure groups who are on hand, well informed,
clear as to aims, and wise in the ways of legislatures. The question raised
here is not if the objectives of the lobbyists are on balance in the general interest, but: Is the system in the general interest, and can it be
improved? ,
)
The simple solution, to put off the date of convening the session, is
not practical. Winter is the most convenient time for ranchers and
farmers to be away from hom~, and these have constituted an important fraction of the membership of the Legislature. Moreover, the
Governor, too, has just been elected. He has or should have a program.
Much of it must be authorized '.and financed by the Legislature. He
must mark time until it acts, and at best his term is short. Consequently he wants and deserves action as soon as is reasonably possible.
Then, too, there are the various state institutions and departments.
The scope of their activities will depend largely upon appropriation.
They must await the Legislature. And private groups also are anxious.
Their taxes, subsidies, regulations, are at stake. All in all, to push the .
session back would appear to be inadvisable.
Could the election be held earlier? It could for both legislators and
state officials. However, there are objections. Two elections are more
expensive than one, two campaigns put a strain on the electorate's
time, patience, and interest. And if the administration changed it
would mean a prolonged lame duck administration.
There are possibilities of improvement within the present system.
The Legislative Council and the interim-eommittees, if properly fi-
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nanced, are of almost inestimable value. Continued, with an increased
staff for the Council service, they might largely solve many problems
if the legislators see fit to use them.
Strong leadership from the Governor can and, in the past, has from
time to time filled the vacuum created by the lack of experience on
the part of the legislators. But this assumes that the Governor has a
program and is prepared to submit measures to implement it, and he
too was elected only sixty days before taking office. He has had to deal
with patronage, consider the personnel of his administration,· weigh
his program. Faced with such a burden of responsibility too many of
the state's governors have made a virtue of necessity and piously invoked the classic doctrine of separation of powers, thus putting the
legislative baby squarely in the legislative lap.
There is another possibility: Extend the term of both the Governor
and members of the House to four years. If desirable, in order to insure a core of veterans in the Legislature, stagger the terms. Add to this
annual sessions and there would be a reasonable expectation that, with
the aid of its Council services and own interim-committees, legislation
would to a large degree represent the informed decision of the
Legislature.
Assuming the adoption of any or all these measures (a large assumption indeed), a serious barrier to the Legislature's ability to act as an
effective agency in the formulation or guidance of public policy remains. Historically, the Legislature's power to control government or
even its own prerogatives has depended largely on its control of the
purse. In New Mexico about 85 per cent of the revenues from state
taxes are earmarked, and the substantial portion of the severance tax
(which with the property tax constitutes the major source of revenue
remaining at the disposal of the Legislature), which has been pledged
for the servicing of bonds issued for institutional building programs
throughout the state, may well bring this to near 90 per cent.
Earmarking is, perhaps, the mo~t pressing problem facing the Legislature today. It is not enough to say that it has gone far enough. It has
gone too far. It threatens to starve those departments, divisions, or
other agencies of government that do not share in the earmarked
funds; in practice it deprives the Legislature of its right to determine
not only how money shall be raised but how it shall be spent; it makes
it difficult for the Legislature to hold departments financed by earmarked funds responsible for their activities; it can spell disaster for
even the apparent beneficiaries, for if the earmarked funds are in-

..
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for their needs they are apt to find scant consideration for
their pleas for more.
In spite of all this some earmarking will probably remain. But 85 to
90 per cent of the state's taxes is too much. It must be cut back, or ne~
sources of revenue must be found, and today a new source of revenue
is not apt to be new. It is merely a new well drilled in the old sourcethe pocket of the taxpayer.
"Unearmarking" earmarked funds is admittedly difficult and politically explosive. The privileged agencies and the clientele served by
them will fight bitterly, and they will be honestly convinced of the
justice of their cause. Nonetheless, if the Legislature wishes to retain
its historic role as a factor in shaping public policy. it must retain and
exercise its historic right to control the purse. Tod~y in New Mexico it
legally retains that right, but in practice it has accepted crippling
restraints on its exercise.
'But the Legislature's troubles over finance do not end with earmarking. A limitation to wise appropriation of even the 10 or 15 per
cent of the state's revenue remaining at its disposal is its lack of its own
budget analyst. At present, in general, the Legislature must accept the
data and programs presented to it by either representatives from the
Governor or those from the agencies, departments and institutions
seeking funds. It has no staff of its own technically competent to
check the information given it and no time, assuming the qualifications, to do it itself.
Thus far the discussions of the State Legislature's role in policy making have centered on the Legislature itself. This is inadequate. Many
outside factors affect its decisions. Among the more important of these
are lobbies operating in the interest of private pressure groups, state
agencies and the clientele they serve, the Federal Government, particularly in relationship to grants-in-aid, and the Governor both as a party
;
leader and tne state's chief executive.
The right of private interests to make their wants known to government and to use legitimate means to obtain favorable action in respect
to those wants is, in a free society, indisputable. Furthermore, it is
probably true that the exercise of this right makes, on the whole, for
a broader based public policy, as it gives the individual a means of
exerting influence through a pressure group as well as by casting a
ballot.
But granting the rights and even the virtues of pressure groups,it
remains true that the American experience has proved beypnd doubt
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that, unrestrained, they are far from an unmixed blessing, and that
their activities frequently result in legislation so favorable to a privileged group that it penalizes the remainder of the community.
Railroads, utilities, lawyers, barbers, liquor dealers, labor unions,
truckers, contractors, an have demands, and the total of these flows
smoothly into the vacuum created by the legislators' lack of tools and
time. Under the circumstances the formulation of public policy passes
largely from the representatives of the people to those of private
pressure groups.
It is difficult, perhaps impossible, to even know the identity of all
the groups that attempt to exert influence on a single session of the
Legislature, and to what purpose, through what channels, and by what
means they are operating. In the absence of such information a verdict
upon the total effect of lobbying in the state would be mere opinion.
However, the desirability of measures that would make informed
judgment possible might well be considered. A law requiring registration of lobbyists accompanied by a statement showing whom they
represent would be at least a start. To be effective, however, the law'
would have to have teeth and it would have to be enforced.
But even laws requiring registration leave many sources of lobbying·
untouched. The state agencies supported by the gtoups they serve
constitute active and persuasive pressure groups. lbe Game and Fish
Department wants better hunting and fishing, so do .hunters and fishermen. The legislators hear about it. The departments of Public.Welfare and Public Health with the flients they serve join in requesting
legislation, generally including appropriation of funds, that will enable
them to do better jobs. The roll'of agencies, departments, commissions and institutions lobbying for legislative favors is long indeed.
And elective officials join in. They want larger staffs, higher salaries,
new powers. All make demands, all have reasons for making demands,
most of the reasons are good.
Finally the Federal Government, particularly through grants-in-aid,
has curtailed the influence of the State Legislature upon policy making.
Practically speaking, a state as poor as New Mexico has no choice but
to accept the aid and pay the price. Nonetheless, the State Legislature
has probably been lax in using the influence remaining to it. A recent
study of state-federal relationships revealed that the legislators were
strongly inclined to accept without much question the demands and
administrative practices of those departments receiving federal grantsin-aid. They reasoned, or at least accepted the plea, that the demands
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must be met if federal subsidy was to continue, and that the administrative practices were regulated by federal requirements. Is it possible
that such reasoning has been naive? The Legislature has been too busy
and too poorly staffed to find out~
. The Legislature's control over expenditure of state funds is further
limited by the State Board of Finance. This board is empowered to
withhold certain percentages of appropriations made by the Legislature. Such a board with such powers is not uncommon and is justified
on the grounds that if legislative appropriations exceed or threaten to
exceed estimated revenues it is better to remedy the situation through
administrative action than face a subsequent Legislature with the
problem of deficiency appropriations.
In New Mexico, the State Board of Finance has upon a number of
occasions met within a few weeks after the adjournment of the Legislature and with no additipnal data, or indeed claim to any, that justified
expectations that revenues would not meet appropriations, cut the
latter. This arbitrary assumption of legislative prerogative would seem
to be justified only on the grounds that the Board of Finance is wiser,
more devoted to the public interest, or more honest than the State
Legislature. This is the doctrine of elitism opposed to that of democracy. Furthermore the history of New Mexico offers no shred of evidence to substantiate. any claim by the board to superior virtue or
intelligence. However, with or without grounds, the broad interpretation of the Board of Finance is practiced, and it diminishes legislative control over appropriation. That control is the cornerstone of
legislative power.
What is the Governor's role as a legislator? The constitution gives
him the veto power, including an item veto over any bill appropriating
money, the power to call special sessions to act upon such matters, and
only such matters, as are included in the call, and through his ap. pointive powers control of patronage, which can be, and frequently is,
transformed into pressure upon the Legislature.
Perhaps the most significant among his appointive powers is that
of appointing the members Qf the State Board of Finance. This board
has the power to alter in some degree legislative appropriation. Such
alteration may wen result in modification of policy as envisaged by the
Legislature. Finally, the Governor's position as head of his party.obligates him to act as chief sponsor of the legislative measures necessary
to carry out the party's program.
Until the election of Andrew Jackson, the veto power was used
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chiefly on measures of doubtful constitutionality. Since that time it
has been moulded by American presidents and governors into a policymaking instrument. Through its use the executive can block po~icy
and by threatening to use it he can gain alterations of policy. In New
Mexico the potency of the veto is enhanced by legislative practice and
the legal authority to veto items;
The legislative practice referred to above is that of postponing the
passage of bills, including appropriation, until the last days and frequently the last hours of the session. This permits the Governor to use
his veto without the risk of having it overridden, or the necessity of
justifying it. Annual sessions and an increase in staff might alleviate,
though it probably would not eliminate; the customary legislative jam.
The relationship between New Mexico's legislators and her governors acting in their capacity as party leaders responsible for the party
program has varied little from the patterns found in other states. Generally speaking, administrative measures necessary to redeem platfo~
and campaign pledges have received favorable legislative action.
However, though there have been exceptions, most of New Mexico's
chief executives have chosen to accept the role of "weak" governor.
This is to say not weak in character, capacity, or vigor, but as legislative
leaders. They have accepted the division of powers and left the Legislature to grapple with its own problems.
, Initiative and referendum, important in some states, have played a
minor role in limiting or affecting legislation in New Mexico. There is
no initiative, and though there is constitutional provision for popular
referendum on laws enacted by the Legslature, this provision is tendered almost meaningless by removing from its scope "general appropriation laws, laws providing for public health, peace or safety, for the
payment of public debt or interest thereon, of the creation of the funding of the same except as in this constitution otherwise provided, for
the maintenance of the public schools and state institutions and local
or special laws."
Most of these exceptions are undoubtedly necessary to protect the
police powers and financial integrity of the state. However, the courts
have interpreted "public peace, health, and safety" so broadly that the
referendum as a means of limiting legislative power is of little
consequence.
New Mexico's Legislature has been worthy of the people it represented. Its members have represented a cross section of the state. It
has, on the whole, worked diligently and met the problems it had to
\

I
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meet. But it has been compelled to work without sufficient tools and
within time limits that have become increasingly restrictive'as the functions and obligations of state government have expanded. 1}1ese limitations have impaired its powers for responsible decision-making and to
some degree that power has been exercised in default by public and
private pressuregr0ups and interests. If this is undesirable the Legislature must be given the tools and the time to do the job itself.
,.
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